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Abstract: 
 
During the past year the temporary holding centre for irregular migrants 
in Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island, has been repeatedly 
denounced for instances of procedural irregularities and alleged human 
rights violations. The degrading treatment of third-country nationals, the 
difficulty in gaining access to the asylum determination process and the 
large scale expulsions to Libya, brought Lampedusa to the attention of 
European and international institutions. The European Parliament, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ Human Rights 
Committee all called on Italy to refrain from collective expulsions of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants to Libya and to respect asylum 
seekers’ right to international protection. Using the material provided by 
the Italian authorities, European institutions and the NGOs, this study 
presents an overview of events and policies implemented by the Italian 
and Libyan Governments, the European Union and the International 
Organization for Migration and outlines the contentions surrounding these 
policies. The paper argues that the implementation of the detention and 
return schemes, commonly discussed in terms of the externalization of 
asylum, does not actually relocate the asylum procedures outside the EU’s 
external borders but rather deprives asylum seekers of the possibility of 
accessing asylum determination procedure. My analysis of migratory 
patterns in Libya further suggests that these policies, implemented to 
deter irregular migratory flows into Europe and combat smuggling in 
migrants, might paradoxically result in ‘illegalizing’ the movement of 
migrants between Libya and the neighbouring African states and in 
increasing the involvement of smuggling networks. The study ends by 
raising the issue of the political responsibility of all actors involved, 
whether they are Governments, supranational bodies or agencies, and 
putting forward policy recommendations for an effective EU framework for 
the protection of asylum seekers.   
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 1. Introduction 
 
During last year the temporary holding centre for irregular migrants in 
Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island, has been repeatedly denounced 
for instances of procedural irregularities and alleged human rights 
violations. The ‘temporary stay and assistance centre’ (CPTA) on 
Lampedusa came to public attention in the fall of 2004 when Italian 
authorities expelled more than thousand undocumented migrants to Libya 
on military and civilian airplanes. Numerous and consistent allegations of 
degrading treatment of third-country nationals in detention in the holding 
centre, the difficulty in gaining access to the asylum determination 
process and the large scale expulsions to Libya, brought it to the attention 
of European and international institutions. The European Parliament (EP), 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the United Nations’ 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) all called on Italy to respect asylum 
seekers and refugees’ right to international protection and to refrain from 
collective expulsions1 of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to Libya, a 
country that has no asylum system and has not a signed the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees.   
 
Positioned some 200 km south of Sicily and 300 km north of Libya, the 
island of Lampedusa became the main point of arrival for boats carrying 
undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Libya to Italy in 2004. 
A total of 10,497 migrants, 412 of whom were minors and 309 women, 
transited through the Lampedusa CPTA that year.2 Migrants commonly 
depart from Libya in overcrowded and makeshift boats and undertake a 
perilous sea journey which can last up to several weeks. Once in the 
Italian waters near Lampdesa, the boats are intercepted by Italian border 
guards and migrants transferred to the island’s holding centre. After 
staying in the holding centre for a period that varies usually between five 
and 45 days, the majority of migrants are transferred to CPTAs in Sicily or 
southern Italy while others are expelled to Libya.    
 
No official data are available on the countries of origin or the reasons for 
migrating for migrants detained in Lampedusa. The UNHCR points to the 
presence of refugees and asylum seekers among those detained as well as 
among those expelled to Libya. The CPTA’s authorities refer to all third-
country nationals held in the centre as ‘illegal migrants’ and claim that 
there are nearly no asylum seekers present among migrants who depart 
from Libya. They also assert that the majority of third-country nationals 
are economic migrants of Egyptian nationality.3 The data gathered in 
Lampedusa by the Italian NGO ARCI and the Médecins sans Frontières 
identify instead Middle East (Iraq and Palestine), Maghreb, Horn of Africa 
(including Sudan) and Sub-Saharan Africa as migrants’ regions of origin.4 
More consistent data on migrants’ countries of origin and the nature of 
their journeys remain however unavailable in spite of the continuity of 
migratory flows from north Africa to the south of Italy since the end of the 
1990s. 
 
The CPTA in Lampedusa is one of eleven existing holding centres, most of 
which are located in the south of Italy. CPTAs are instruments for the 
detention of undocumented migrants pending expulsion and their purpsoe 
is to ensure effective functioning of expulsion procedures. Identified as 
complementary, detention and expulsion of undocumented migrants are 
crucial pillars of Italy’s politics towards irregular migration. In the effort to 
control undocumented migratory flows from Africa into its territory, Italy 
established a collaboration on illegal migration with Libya, its southern 
Mediterranean neighbour. Initially signed in 2000 as a general agreement 
to fight terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration, in 2003 and 2004 
Italian-Libyan partnership extended to include a readmission agreement, 
training for Libyan police officers and border guards, and Italian-funded 
detention and repatriation programmes for irregular migrants in Libya. 
The aim of these schemes is to deter irregular migration and to prevent 
further migrants’ deaths at sea by combating smuggling networks.  
 
This paper presents an overview of events and policies implemented in 
Lampedusa and Libya respectively and outlines the issues surrounding 
these policies. Using the material provided by the Italian authorities, 
European institutions and the NGOs, the paper further examines the 
schemes developed by the Italian and Libyan Governments, the European 
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Union and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as main 
actors involved in implementing immigration-related programmes and 
polices in Lampedusa and Libya. A methodological note is necessary here. 
The data available on measures regarding detention and deportations of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa and Libya are often 
contradictory and incomplete. In the case of Lampedusa, scarce 
information provided by Italian authorities was lately supplemented by 
data gathered by the European Parliament, the NGOs and journalists. 
When it comes to Libya, the content of agreements, whether between the 
Italian and Libyan Governments or between the latter and the IOM, 
remain undisclosed. Hence, rather than offering an exhaustive description 
of legislative acts the first two sections of the paper make use of the 
legislative framework as a way of contextualizing the main procedures and 
policies carried out in Lampedusa and Libya.  
 
Having examined, in the first two sections of the paper, the issues 
surrounding Italy’s alleged violation of the right to asylum, the non-
refoulment principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions, the 
following two sections focus on migratory patterns into and from Libya 
that raise questions about a number of assumptions behind the Italian 
Government’s detention and deportation policies. The third section 
engages the images of emergency and the mass influx of undocumented 
migrants commonly summoned by both Governments and the media to 
portray migratory flows from Africa and shows that these images are 
erroneous representation of contemporary Mediterranean migration. They 
conceal Italy’s reluctance to assume its share of asylum responsibilities 
within the European Union.  
 
Italy’s policies of detention and deportation and Libya’s enhancement of 
border control in particular towards its Sub-Saharan neighbours are 
examined in section four in relation to their function in deterring irregular 
migration and combating smuggling networks. The analysis undertaken 
here suggests that these policies might yield paradoxical effects such as 
‘illegalizing’ the movement of certain groups of migrants and increasing 
rather than decreasing the involvement of smuggling networks.    
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 Italy’s implementation of policies and schemes that increase migrants’ and 
asylum seekers’ vulnerability and hamper the right of the latter group to 
access the asylum procedure raises the issue of the European 
Commission’s (EC) responsibility and the EU’s commitment to the 
protection of refugees. The return of undocumented migrants from EU 
Member states and the collaboration with Libya on matters of irregular 
migration will soon be regulated by the EU Return Directive and the Libya-
EU Joint Action Plan. These instruments are designed to provide a 
minimum set of procedural and legal safeguards for the return, removal 
and custody of third-county nationals residing illegally in EU Member 
States and limit the EU’s involvement in the detention facilities in Libya to 
the provision of heath care and services rather than support of return 
schemes. The analysis in section five of the Return Directive and the 
Action Plan, as well as of the EC-funded IOM programmes in Libya raise 
the issue of whether or not the Commission is contracting out of its 
responsibilities over migration and asylum matters and whether the 
Return Directive and the Action Plan leave too large a space for the 
Member states to circumvent the EU framework and apply restrictive 
exceptions.  
 
Since the EU Return Directive and the Joint Action Plan are still to be 
finalized, the last section of this paper outlines a number of policy 
recommendations that would strengthen the Commission’s credibility 
regarding its monitoring responsibility and the EU’s commitment to 
refugee protection. Given the current lack of safeguards and control 
mechanisms on return, and on EU cooperation with Libya, the 
recommendations point to the role of the European Parliament in 
promoting a credible and effective framework for the protection of asylum 
seekers. This paper recommends that transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy are key principles that should guide the European Union’s 
partnership with its neighbour states in the field of asylum, borders and 
immigration.  
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 2. Lampedusa holding centre: detention and the right to asylum 
 
Lampedusa holding centre is located on the island’s airport next to the 
runway to which it has direct access.5 Surrounded by barbed wire and 
metal grilles, the centre is composed of four prefabricated containers 
designated to host 186 people.6 In the words of Italian officials it is a 
‘temporary stay and assistance centre’ functioning as a ‘clearing station’ 
and an ‘initial assistance’ centre for undocumented migrants after they 
have disembarked on the island.7 Its function as a ‘clearing station’ 
consists in redirecting migrants and asylum seekers within the shortest 
necessary time to other CPTAs in Italy or returning them to the country of 
last transit, usually Libya. The ‘initial assistance’ stands for the emergency 
health care, clothing and food that undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers are provided with during the period they are held in the CPTA 
awaiting transfer/removal. The CPTA is mainly active between April and 
October, when the weather conditions permit sea travel from Libya to 
Italy’s southern shores.  
 
As instruments for the detention of irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers, CPTAs were established under ‘Turco-Napoletano’ law with the 
purpose of administrative detention of third-country nationals pending 
expulsion from Italy.8 Asylum seekers, as well as migrants who have been 
served an expulsion order, are detained in CPTAs if they present an 
asylum application after having received an expulsion or refusal of entry 
order and/or if their appeal is at the final stage and they are awaiting the 
court’s decision on the appeal. The maximum period of detention for both 
groups is 60 days.9 The CPTAs however do not cater primarily to asylum 
seekers. The so-called ‘Bossi-Fini’ law amended the detention regulations 
set by ‘Turco-Napoletano’ law and established ‘identification centres’ as 
specific centres for the detention of asylum seekers.10 While detention of 
asylum seekers cannot be carried out with the sole purpose of examining 
their application, it is nevertheless mandatory in cases when asylum 
seekers present their application after being arrested for entering or 
attempting to enter the country illegally, and/or residing in Italy in an 
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irregular situation.11 An asylum seeker can be held in an identification 
centre for a maximum of 30 days.12 The Italian Government is currently in 
the process of establishing ‘polifunctional’ immigration centres to carry out 
administrative and juridical functions of both CPTAs and identification 
centres. 
 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the holding centre on Lampedusa was 
denounced for the lack of access to the asylum procedure. European 
NGOs13 have drawn attention to the failure of the centre’s authorities to 
provide information about the possibility of claiming asylum and to 
guarantee individual examination of asylum through in-depth interviews 
that assess asylum seeker’s individual circumstance. Migrants and asylum 
seekers, the NGOs remark, have no effective access to an interpreter, and 
are often identified by staff not qualified as interpreters14 by the use of 
improvised identification procedures in which the migrant’s nationality is 
determined on the basis of their skin colour and facial characteristics.15 
Migrants and asylum seekers are deprived of the freedom of movement 
and are allocated phone-cards only on a sporadic basis. Their lawyers 
reside in Sicily, some 200km north of Lampedusa. The NGOs have 
therefore argued that migrants have no effective access to legal aid.16  
 
The lack of proper interpretation and legal services, the difficulty 
experienced by MPs, UNHCR17 and NGOs in obtaining the permission to 
access the CPTA,18 and the withdrawal of information explaining the 
reasons for detention, leave migrants and asylum seekers with little 
possibility of defending themselves and/or appeal. The difficulty of 
accessing the asylum procedure puts asylum seekers in a legally 
extremely vulnerable position since they can be served the refusal of 
entry order. This in turn constitutes the legal basis for their expulsion from 
Italy or for subsequent detention in a CPTA, as they have already received 
a refusal of entry order prior to presenting their asylum application. Lack 
of in-depth individual assessment, serving of refusal orders to potential 
asylum seekers and their subsequent collective expulsion to Libya are 
reasons given by the NGOs for claiming that Italy is in breach of the 
Geneva Convention’s non-refoulement principle.   
 8
 The NGOs also gathered evidence of the arbitrary detention and degrading 
treatment of third-country nationals in the Lampedusa centre. ARCI, an 
Italian NGO that undertook independent monitoring on Lampedusa 
between June and October 2005 maintains that a very small number of 
migrants and asylum seekers are served an expulsion or refusal of entry 
order. This puts into question the legal basis of detention since migrants 
and asylum seekers are nevertheless detained in the CPTA for a period 
between 25 and 45/50 days awaiting their transfer to another CPTA or 
removal to Libya (ARCI 2005).19  The amount of time that migrants and 
asylum seekers spend in the CPTA is not officially recorded as detention 
meaning that, once they have been moved to another CPTA, they can still 
be detained for the maximum period allowed. Minors and pregnant women 
are held, as ARCI reports, with male adults and no special assistance is 
provided to them.20 The centre is permanently overcrowded21 and the 
detention conditions degrading: there is for example, no access to the 
proper health assistance22 and the hygienic conditions are substandard.23 
In addition to the denunciation of the use of force during the removal 
operations, recent journalistic sources have also disclosed the abuse of 
migrants while in detention by law enforcement officers.24 These removals 
are often carried out by use of force, especially when migrants are 
reluctant to board the plane and attempt to run away, and by coercive 
methods such as the use of plastic handcuffs.25
 
On the basis of gathered data ten European NGOs have taken legal 
actions against the Italian Government, filed a complaint with the 
European Commission26 and called the Commission to sanction Italy for:  
 
 Violation of the right of defence and of all parties to be heard27 and 
hence the right to asylum as recognised by the Amsterdam Treaty 
 Violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, provided for in article 4 of the European Charter of 
fundamental rights and article 3 of the European Convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms28  
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In the complaint of the 20 January 2005 as well as in successive open 
letters to the Council and the Commission,29 Amnesty International urged 
the Commission to publicly distance itself from the actions of the Italian 
authorities and to carry out an independent investigation regarding Italy’s 
compliance with international legal obligations as part of the EU acquis.30
 
Italian authorities confirm the NGOs’ data on the 350-400 daily average 
presence in the Lampedusa CPTA, the case of overcrowding of up to 1000 
people during the summer months and the presence of women and 
minors. Their position diverges though on other points raised by NGOs. 
Even though there are cases when third-country nationals are detained for 
up to 60 days, the Italian authorities maintain that in most cases 
migrants’ stay at the CPTA does not exceed four to five days. They state 
that the majority of detained migrants are Egyptian nationals and that 
nationality is determined on the basis of their physical characteristics and 
accent, as well as by a short individual interview, to which everyone is 
entitled. As explained by the Italian authorities, if migrants do not come 
forward to request asylum they are immediately repatriated to Libya or to 
their country of origin.31 Those who however do request asylum are 
moved to the Crotone CPTA, on the Italian mainland. The authorities state 
also that the majority of third-country nationals arriving from Libya are 
not asylum seekers but rather economic migrants.  
 
Despite the denial by the Italian government that human rights violations 
take place in Lampedusa holding centre,32 the United Nations’ Human 
Rights Committee expressed concern about the conditions of detention 
and procedures there.  It called on Italy to keep the Committee closely 
informed about the ongoing administrative and judicial inquiries on 
matters of detention conditions, procedural irregularities and collective 
deportations to Libya.33 Given the seriousness of the numerous allegations 
raised by NGOs, a delegation of twelve MEPs, part of the Committee on 
Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the 
European Parliament, arrived on the island of Lampedusa on 15th and 16th 
September 2005 in order to assess the identification and removal 
procedures, the treatment of the detainees and the running of the CPTA. 
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This visit was preceded by the EP’s Resolution on Lampedusa in April, in 
which the EP called on Italy to guarantee the individual examination of the 
requests for asylum and grant UNHCR free access to the Lampedusa 
CPTA. As for the European NGOs, the EP called on the European 
Commission to ensure that the Member States comply with their 
obligations under the EU law and that the right of asylum is respected in 
the EU.34  
 
 
3. Libya and the case of collective expulsions  
 
Between October 2004 and March 2005, Italian authorities returned more 
than 1500 irregular migrants and asylum seekers to Libya from 
Lampedusa holding centre. The biggest operation took place between the 
1st and 7th of October 2004, four days before the EU lifted its eight-year-
long arms embargo on Libya on 11th October 2004. During those six days, 
a total of 1153 irregular migrants and asylum seekers were expelled to 
Libya. The operations continued throughout spring and summer with 
expulsions of another 494 people in March, 150 in May, 45 in June and 65 
in August 2005. No information is available concerning the whereabouts of 
migrants and asylum seekers expelled to Libya.35 Human Rights Watch 
believes that the majority has been detained in Libyan detention camps.36
 
The expulsions from the Lampedusa CPTA to Libya are part of Italian-
Libyan collaboration on matters of irregular migration regulated though a 
bilateral agreement signed in Tripoli in August 2004. While the content of 
the agreement is still undisclosed despite solicitations from the European 
Parliament,  UN Human Rights Committee and various European NGOs, 
the EP believes that the agreement requires Libyan authorities to 
supervise irregular migration within and into its territory and commits 
them to readmit migrants returned by Italy.37 In addition to this bilateral 
agreement, Italy and Libya also signed in 2000 in Rome an agreement to 
fight terrorism, organized crime, drugs traffic and illegal migration. In 
September 2002 in Tripoli an operational agreement also led in July 2003 
to the establishment of a permanent liaison on organized crime and illegal 
 11
migration between Italian police officers and Libyan Security General 
Directorate.38 The collaboration between the two countries extends 
beyond expulsions from Lampedusa holding centre and includes the 
construction of detention centres and the development of return schemes 
in Libya. In 2003 Italy financed the construction of a camp for illegal 
migrants in the north of the country (Gharyan) close to Tripoli. For the 
2004-2005 period Italy allocated funds for the realization of two more 
camps: one in the city of Kufra located in the south-east close to the 
border with Egypt and Sudan, and the other in city of Sebha in the south-
west of Libya.39 In 2003 and 2004 Italy also financed a programme of 
charter flights for the repatriation of irregular migrants from Libya. A total 
of 5688 migrants were repatriated on 47 charter flights, with Egypt, 
Ghana and Nigeria as the main destinations.40  
 
Future detention and expulsion schemes are being developed in 
collaboration with IOM, a key partner for both Italian and Libyan 
governments.41 Italy was scheduled to fund an IOM pilot project in Libya 
starting in August 2005.42 As far as Libya is concerned, following the 
agreement signed on the 9th August 2005 for opening of an IOM office in 
Tripoli,43 IOM and Libya defined a programme of activities with the aim of 
supporting the Libyan Government to counter illegal migration and 
develop a long-term migration management approach. Under the 
Programme for the Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration 
Management (TRIM), IOM will be responsible for:  
 
 Labour selection programmes for migrant workers in order to 
supply Libya’s labour demand; 
 Information campaigns to warn potential migrants about the 
dangers of irregular migration; 
 Improvement of services (such as heath care) and conditions of 
detention for irregular migrants in detention centres in Libya; 
 Development of an Assisted Voluntary Return Programme (AVR) 
and Reinsertion programme aiming to return irregular migrants in 
Libya to their countries of origin; 
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 Strengthening of cooperation on irregular migration between origin 
and destination countries.44     
 
NGOs claim that the signing of the bilateral agreement between Libya and 
Italy in August 2004 led to widespread arrests in Libya of individuals from 
sub-Saharan Africa,45 and that 106 migrants lost their lives during 
subsequent repatriations from Libya to Niger.46 NGOs point out that due to 
the improvised identification practices in Lampedusa CPTA migrants and 
asylum seekers are at risk of being expelled to a country with which they 
have no relationship. The improvised identification of large numbers of 
migrants as Egyptians, NGOs claim, is at the base of forced collective 
removals of migrants first to Libya and later to Egypt with whom Libya 
collaborates in matters of illegal migration.47 The NGOs and activists have 
pressured air carriers to refuse to expel migrants from Lampedusa to 
Libya.48  
 
Evidence gathered by Amnesty International (AI) points further to the risk 
that removed asylum seekers and irregular migrants face in Libya. As AI 
documented, the Libyan State practices incommunicado detention of 
suspected political opponents, migrants and possible asylum seekers, 
torture while in detention, unfair trials leading to long-term prison 
sentences or the death penalty, and ‘disappearance’ and death of political 
prisoners in custody. Migrants and asylum seekers in particular are often 
victims of arbitrary detention, inexistent or unfair trials, killings, and 
disappearances and torture in the detention camps.49 Once migrants and 
asylum seekers are detained in Libya there is virtually no way for NGOs to 
assist them or verify the conditions of detention and the relative expulsion 
procedure. The Libyan detention centres are in fact almost inaccessible to 
international organizations or human rights groups and UNHCR is unable 
to access people returned from Lampedusa to Libya since it cannot 
operate its protection mandate in Libya.   
 
In light of gathered data on current removal practices, a coalition of 13 
European NGOs50 proposed to the Member States and the EU a number of 
core principles to be applied during the repatriations in order to ensure 
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that the policies fully respect the needs and dignity of individuals.51 In the 
complaint filed with the European Commission concerning the expulsions 
from Lampedusa holding centre to Libya, the NGOs called onto the 
Commission to sanction Italy for: 
 
 Violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions provided for in 
article 4 of the 4th Protocol of the European Charter of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and fundamental freedoms, and article II-19-1 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and article 13 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
 Violation of the non-refoulement principle52 prescribed in article 33 of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture53 
 
Italian authorities have responded to the allegations of collective 
expulsions by invoking article 10 of Law 189/2002 and in particular the 
procedures regarding the refusal of entry (respingimento alla frontiera). 
The authorities claim that removals from the Lampedusa CPTA are not 
expulsions but rather refusals of entry on an individual basis. An expulsion 
needs to be decided by the judge and prohibits entry into Italy for ten 
years while a refusal of entry is an administrative measure that does not 
ban the migrant from entering the Italian territory in the future.54 
Irregular migrants reaching Lampedusa are hence served refusals of entry 
and returned to Libya as they have transited Libya prior to reaching Italy. 
Italian authorities insist that the refusals of entry take place on a case-by-
case basis and that since the majority of migrants reaching Lampedusa 
are economic migrants rather than refugees, Italy is not in violation of the 
non-refoulement principle or in breach of the Geneva Convention.55 The 
Italian Government has explained its refusal to disclose the content of the 
bilateral agreement with Libya by saying that making the agreement 
public would diminish the success of countering smuggling and trafficking 
networks responsible for organizing and profiting from irregular migration 
from Libya into Italy.   
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In its observations on Italy during its 85th Session in Geneva in November 
200556, the UN Human Rights Committee raised the issue of the right to 
international protection and recalled the right of each person not to be 
expelled to a country where he/she might face torture or ill-treatment. 
Along similar lines, in its Resolution on Lampedusa the European 
Parliament called on Italy to refrain from collective expulsions to Libya and 
took the view that these expulsions constitute a violation of the principle 
of non-refoulement. EP also called on Libya to allow access to 
international observers, halt the expulsions and arbitrary arrests of 
migrants, ratify the Geneva Convention and recognize the mandate of the 
UNHCR.  
 
 
4. Misrepresentation of migratory flows to Italy  
 
The Italian Government considers the detentions in the Lampedusa CPTA 
and the successive expulsions to Libya to be indispensable measures for 
countering the emergency caused by the influx of people from Libya and 
for deterring ‘a million illegal migrants’ waiting on Libyan shores from 
crossing over to Italy.57 At first glance, the image of ‘a million illegal 
migrants’ might express the Italian State’s difficulty in managing large-
scale migration from the South. The expression, however, merits a more 
serious consideration because it brings together a number of 
misconceptions that inform Italy’s migratory policies: it inflates the 
numbers so as to produce the imagery of invasion, assumes that entries 
via the southern border constitute the majority of Italy’s undocumented 
migrants and conveys the image that the bulk of migratory flows in and 
through Libya is clandestine and headed towards Europe.  
 
As for the migration from Eastern Europe during the 1990s –to which 
scholars now refer as ‘the invasion that never took place’58— so for the 
current migration to Italy via Libya. The reference to the magnitude of 
migratory flows invokes the fantasy of invasion from the South. The 
existing data offer however a different image of migratory flows towards 
Italy. The recent report from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
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indicates that the majority of third-country nationals residing illegally in 
the country have reached Italy neither via sea nor having crossed its 
borders undocumented. They have on the contrary, entered the county at 
its land borders with a valid entry clearance and have become 
undocumented either once their visa expired or after they overstayed 
their permit of residence. According to the same source, only 10% of 
undocumented migrants currently residing in Italy entered the country 
‘illegally’ via its sea borders.59  
 
The arrival of circa 10,500 migrants and asylum seekers to the island of 
Lampedusa in 2004 certainly represents a heavy load for a small island of 
20km² with a population of 5500. Yet, if we exaggerate the numbers and 
assume for analytical purposes only that all of 10,500 migrants are 
asylum seekers, this would certainly provoke a sharp increase in numbers 
of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy from 901960 to more than its 
double. What might appear at a first glance as a worrisome perspective 
needs to be viewed in proportion to the national population size. The 9019 
applications filed in 2004 translate roughly to Italy receiving 16 asylum 
seekers per 100,000 inhabitants.61 Even if doubled, the total number of 
requests for asylum in Italy would be of 34 per 100,000 and hence still 
remain below the EU average of 60 asylum seekers per 100,000 
inhabitants.62 While this increase is a hypothetical one, it is nevertheless 
useful as to illustrate the gap between asylum trends in Italy and other EU 
countries and to point to Italy’s reluctance in taking on its share of asylum 
responsibilities within the EU.   
 
An example of this reluctance is the earlier discussed fact that the Italian 
authorities maintain that migrants arriving from Libya to Lampedusa are 
economic migrants rather than asylum seekers. They refer to all of them 
as illegal migrants. Since the Libyan government does not recognize the 
category of asylum seekers and since the authorities of Lampedusa CPTA 
allegedly fail to investigate migrants’ nationality and classify the majority 
as Egyptians, there is no record which would permit a systematic 
identification of migrants’ countries of origin. If such a record was 
available, it would indicate that refugees are indeed part of migratory 
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flows that transit Libya. This can be seen clearly in the case of Malta 
where the majority of new arrivals in 2004 were from the conflict affected 
countries of Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Somalia.63  
 
Libya’s migratory reality is far from being, as suggested by the image of ‘a 
million illegal migrants’ on its shores, a country of emigration or a transit 
route for clandestine migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa to Italy. On the 
contrary, Libya is in first place a destination country and the major 
country of immigration in the Maghreb. Foreign nationals constitute 
approximately 25-30% of Libya’s total population. Large-scale economic 
and social development schemes in the 1970s, launched thanks to the 
revenues from the petroleum industry, relied in the first instance on 
migrant labourers from Egypt. Egyptian nationals, employed mainly in the 
agriculture industry and education, constitute today the largest migrant 
group in Libya.64 Libya is home also to a large Maghrebi community (from 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) 65 and the country’s economic development 
relies on the cheap and seasonal labour from the neighbouring countries 
of Niger, Chad and Sudan.66 Since the 1990s, labour migrants from 
neighbouring African countries have been a key factor in Libya’s economic 
growth. The influx of migrant workers from sub-Saharan states is 
prompted by Libya’s reorientation from pan-Arab to pro-African policy67 
and its active role in the foundation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
states (CEN-SAD) which, as an economic project grounded in the free 
circulation of people and goods between its member states, is oriented 
towards regional cooperation and integration.68 Migrant workers from 
Sudan, Chad and Niger are generally present in the Libyan Saharan 
border areas where they work in sectors such as agriculture, tourism and 
local trade. These labour migrations, facilitated by the open border policy 
towards sub-Saharan Africa are of temporary and pendular character 
rather than, as commonly assumed, the source of irregular migratory 
movement to Europe.69  
 
Inflating the numbers relative to the migratory flows to Italy from Libya, 
as some politicians and elements of the mass media have done, results in 
an erroneous and misleading representation of Libya’s migratory history 
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and of the contemporary migration in the Mediterranean area. Images 
such as a ‘million illegal migrants’ produce and manipulate the fear of 
invasion through a distorted account of migratory patterns in Libya and 
conceal Italy’s reluctance to admit asylum seekers and refugees to its 
territory and, atypically for an EU state, its failure to pass an organic law 
on the right to asylum that has been under discussion since the 2002. 
 
 
5. The production of illegal migration 
 
Much attention has been given to collective expulsion of third-country 
nationals from Lampedusa CPTA to Libya in terms of the ‘externalisation’ 
of asylum. Externalisation refers to the propensity of several EU Member 
States to establish centres for processing asylum applications outside the 
EU’s external borders. In fact, the expulsions to Libya occurred in a highly 
charged political atmosphere surrounding the proposal to set up refugee 
processing centres in North Africa.70 Initially put forward by the UK and 
rejected during the Thessaloniki European Council (19-20 June 2003), the 
proposal envisioned the establishment of ‘Regional Processing Areas’ 
(RPAs) and ‘Transit Processing Centres’ (TPCs) located outside the 
external borders of the EU.71 Under this proposal, promoted some months 
earlier by Denmark,72 RPAs were to be located in the zones of origin of 
refugees as a means of strengthening reception capacities close to the 
areas of crisis. On the other hand, the location of TPCs closer to EU 
borders was envisioned as centres where asylum seekers and refugees 
were to submit their asylum claims and await the result of their 
applications. France, Spain and Sweden rejected the proposal for refugee 
processing centres. Nevertheless, in October 2004, the month of the 
largest collective expulsions from Lampedusa CPTA to Libya, the informal 
EU Justice and Home Affairs Council considered the implementation of five 
pilot projects with the aim of upgrading the existing detention facilities 
and developing asylum laws in North-West Africa. Proposed by the EC and 
co-funded by the Netherlands, the pilot projects targeted Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.73  
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On the basis of this chronology of events, it is tempting to identify the 
collective expulsions from Lampedusa to Libya in terms of the 
externalisation of asylum. The fact that third-country nationals are 
precluded from presenting asylum claims, removed from Lampedusa to 
Libya and then most likely placed in the detention facilities financed by the 
Italian Government, might indeed seem to constitute the externalisation 
of asylum. The idea of externalisation presupposes however that asylum 
seekers and refugees are relocated to facilities where they are granted 
protection and where they can access the asylum determination 
procedure. Since the external processing centres do not yet exist and 
since Libya in practice has no refugee policy, Italy’s expulsion of third-
country nationals to Libya constitutes a retraction of the right to asylum 
rather than its externalisation.74 As such, the policy of expulsions carries 
the risk of being counterproductive. Whereas the expulsions are carried 
out as a deterrent for undocumented migration, the obstacles to filing an 
asylum request are likely to increase irregular migration. In fact, those 
who would otherwise seek asylum might become irregular migrants due to 
the effective impossibility in accessing the asylum procedure.75  
 
The deterrence of unwanted migration from Africa, the core element of 
Italian-Libyan cooperation on irregular migration, extends further to 
border guard training and the supply of devices and equipment requested 
by the Libyan authorities to achieve a better control of the country’s sea 
and land borders, in particular those with Sub-Saharan Africa.76 These 
measures are inter alia geared towards combating the smuggling of 
migrants and preventing further loss of lives at sea due to overcrowded 
boats and smugglers’ negligence. While well intended, the idea of 
strengthening border controls in order to prevent smuggling and 
trafficking in migrants can yield paradoxical consequences. Libya’s open 
border policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and in particular towards Chad, 
Niger and Sudan is a key point in the regional integration of Sahelian 
Africa. Following the EC’s technical mission to Libya, experts confirmed 
that many migrants from these countries settled in the southern cities of 
the Libyan desert without the intention of further transit to Europe.77 
Strengthening the control at the border between Libya and its sub-
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Saharan African neighbours is likely to create obstacles to the free 
movement of people and illegalise the region’s seasonal labour 
migration.78  
 
The case of the EU’s enlargement eastward showed that tightening of 
border and visa controls enhances migrants’ vulnerability and feeds into 
smuggling networks. As research on the demand for the labour of 
trafficked migrants’ has shown, if arranging a visa is not cheap and easy 
migrants will not be able to access (even when available) the formal 
governmental channels for migration.79 Instead, they will resort to 
irregular channels that in turn take advantage of migrants’ legal 
vulnerability, whether by charging higher costs for travel and documents 
or profiting from their labour at various points of the journey.80 Stricter 
immigration controls aimed at preventing trafficking do not necessarily 
protect migrants from abuse but might foster migrants’ vulnerability to 
violence during travel, increase the costs of ‘doing business’ for 
traffickers81 and leave ample space for third parties’ profiteering and 
abuse.  
 
The little data available from Libya confirm these findings. Following the 
signing of the bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya in August 
2004, journalistic sources reported that Libyan authorities targeted sub-
Saharan Africans with arrests, detentions and deportations.82 These 
allegations were confirmed by the EC’s technical mission to Libya during 
which experts verified that recent arrests and detentions were often of 
arbitrary nature and affected migrants from Niger, Ghana and Mali who 
have been working in Libya for more than a decade.83 The operations of 
repatriation, currently the main focus of Libyan authorities especially in 
the south of the country, are organized by the state or at times requested 
by migrants who prefer to pay for their own return rather than remain 
detained for an indeterminate period of time. Italian journalist Fabrizio 
Gatti who travelled with returnees on a lorry from Libya to Niger via the 
desert, reported that these returns expose migrants to various type of 
abuse. These vary from financial profiteering (following the increase in 
arrests and expulsions third parties who organize travel have allegedly 
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tripled the price of the journey out of Libya), theft (third parties steal 
migrants’ belongings and leave them in the desert), labour exploitation 
(migrants who run out of money during the journey get stuck in various 
settlements in the desert they their work under harsh conditions in 
exchange for food and shelter), and death (caused by overcrowding in 
lorries or lack of water).84 While more substantial figures on the impact of 
current immigration policies on migrants’ lives in Libya are still missing, 
the data gathered so far suggest that the measures geared towards 
curbing irregular migration are likely to increase migrants’ vulnerability 
and the involvement of third parties due to the rise in profit to be made 
from smuggling activities.85  
 
The conditions of ‘illegality’ are however not only produced as a result of 
expulsions to or tightening of immigration control in Libya. While most of 
the attention so far has been paid to the implications of collective 
removals from Lampedusa to Libya, the fact that the majority of the 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers are transferred from Lampedusa 
CPTA to other Italian CPTAs went overlooked. This continuous detention 
follows the logic intrinsic to CPTAs’ constitution, namely that detention is 
indispensable to ensure an effective removal policy. The data that 
appeared in the report from Italy’s Audit Court undermine the argument 
that CPTAs are a key means for effective functioning of expulsions. The 
report shows in fact that out of 11883 irregular migrants detained in 
Italian CPTAs in 2004, less than half were deported while the rest escaped 
or were released after the expiration of the maximum detention period.86 
Since the majority of migrants are actually released from the CPTAs after 
they have been served a removal order, scholars have suggested we view 
detention camps not as institutions geared towards deportations but 
rather as sites that on the one hand, function as a filter mechanism for 
the selective inclusion of certain groups of migrants and on the other, 
produce ‘illegality’ and hence the condition of ‘deportability’.87 This 
reasoning is of great relevance in particular for the asylum seekers 
transferred from Lampedusa CPTA to another Italian CPTA: asylum 
seekers’ detention becomes in fact mandatory only after they have been 
served a refusal of entry order in Lampedusa.88 Moreover, once released 
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from a CPTA with the order to leave Italy, asylum seekers find themselves 
in an irregular situation: if they overstay the period of five days within 
which they must leave the country, they are susceptible to incarceration 
on the basis of having committed an offence by failing to observe the 
expulsion order.89   
 
As research has shown in several instances, border controls, detentions 
and expulsion practices do not prevent people from moving from their 
countries of origin, nor from reaching Europe, but rather they raise the 
costs and dangers of migration. The alarmist portrayals that invoke the 
image of a massive influx of undocumented entries from Libya to Italy 
hinder a correct understanding of existing migratory patterns and the 
responsibility of the states in reducing legal channels of migration and 
impeding access to asylum so that in contemporary times illegality has 
become a structural characteristic of migratory flows.90  
 
 
6. Renounced Responsibilities: the EU framework 
 
As well as being matters for Italy’s national legislation and initiative, the 
return of illegal third-country nationals from Lampedusa holding centre 
and the collaboration with Libya on migration issues are also regulated by 
the EU framework. The EU Directive on Return and the Action Plan on 
Libya  (both still to be finalized) are part of the agenda to establish a 
comprehensive Community policy on immigration and asylum. The EU 
Return Directive provides a minimum set of procedural and legal 
safeguards for third-county nationals residing illegally in EU Member 
States concerning their return, removal and custody.91 Once in force, by 
prioritising voluntary return over forced removal, by providing for a right 
to an effective judicial remedy with suspensive effect against return 
decisions and removal orders, and by limiting the use of temporary 
custody to the cases that present the risk of absconding, the Directive 
would legally oblige the authorities of the Lampedusa holding centre to 
revise their removal practices in accordance with the standards set by the 
EU. However, it is very likely that the Directive will not affect the situation 
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and procedures in Lampedusa given the fact that the holding centre has a 
special status, namely, that of a clearing station.92 In fact, according to 
the Article 2.2 of the Return Directive, the Member States are not obliged 
to apply the directive to the third-country nationals who have been 
refused entry in a transit zone of a Member State. Classifying Lampedusa 
holding centre as a clearing station therefore circumvents the Return 
Directive and relieves Italian authorities of the obligation to bring removal 
practices in Lampedusa in line with common EU standards.93  
 
The discussions between the European Union and Libya regarding 
migration management have intensified throughout 2005 and are 
currently directed towards drawing a Joint Action Plan.94 Developed under 
the framework of the external dimension of the common European asylum 
and immigration policy laid out by the Hague programme with the aim of 
integrating asylum into EU’s external relations with third countries, the 
cooperation between the EU and Libya is geared towards defining 
operational measures to counter illegal migration. The Joint Action Plan 
that is currently being drafted outlines inter alia the enhancement of 
border control at Libya’s sea, southern land and air borders, training of 
Libyan law enforcement officers including a thematic programme on 
asylum, refurbishment of detention camps and dialogue with main 
countries of origin as the main components of the EU-Libyan 
partnership.95 Given the fact that Libya does not have a functioning 
asylum system in place and that it is not party to the Geneva Convention, 
the Action Plan proposes to limit the EU’s intervention as far as detention 
centres are concerned to the provision of health care and advice and to 
postpone assistance for return operations until conditionality requirements 
ensuring adequate protection of refugees are met by Libya.96  
 
Despite the evidence of grave human rights violations in Libya, suggesting 
that it falls short of conditionality requirements, and prior to the EU’s 
outlining of the conditions for the formalised cooperation in the field of 
return, Italy financed construction of detention camps and a program of 
charter flights for the repatriation of illegal migrants from Libya. In so 
doing, Italy circumvented the EU’s framework on immigration and asylum. 
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This however does not exempt the EU from its responsibilities on the 
matter. The EU Return Directive and the Action Plan on Libya are both 
new instruments and both need to be finalized. Despite ample evidence of 
procedural irregularities and allegations of collective expulsions from 
Lampedusa holding centre, the Commission’s Proposal for a Return 
Directive gives Member States the possibility of not applying the Directive 
in transit zones. In a similar manner, the EU also went ahead to develop 
cooperation on irregular migration with Libya despite evidence of human 
rights violations there, no guarantee of refugee rights and no official 
recognition of UNHCR protection mandate. Moreover, while the draft of 
the Action Plan specifies that no EU funding will be provided for return 
until the conditionality requirements are met, it does not mention any 
limitations to be imposed on bilateral agreements on return such as the 
one between Italy and Libya.  
 
The EU Return Directive and the Action Plan both strengthen Member 
States’ discretion and leave ample space for the states, in this case Italy, 
to apply the exception.97 The wide discretion available for the application 
of restrictive exceptions, and the Commission’s position on the case of 
Lampedusa that Italy’s compliance with its international obligations is a 
matter not to be decided by the Commission but by Italy itself under its 
national law, undermines the credibility of the Commission’s monitoring 
responsibility and the EU’s commitment to protect refugees.  
 
The issue of the Commission’s responsibility as far as the right of asylum 
is concerned is further raised by its co-financing of the TRIM programme 
in Libya.98 Under the TRIM Programme, developed and implemented by 
the IOM, the Commission is funding IOM to improve the services and 
conditions of detention for irregular migrants in detention centres,99 to 
develop a so-called Assisted Voluntary Return Programme (AVR) and 
Reinsertion programme to support irregular migrants in returning to their 
countries of origin, and to strengthen cooperation on irregular migration 
between origin and destination countries.100 Contrary to its commitment 
not to assist Libya financially with repatriations, the Commission is de 
facto funding a return scheme for the repatriation of irregular migrants 
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and asylum seekers via its collaboration with the IOM. Similar to Italy’s 
expulsion of irregular migrants and asylum seekers to Libya and Libya’s 
delegation of detention and repatriations matter to IOM, the Commission 
also contracts out to IOM its responsibility over migration and asylum 
matters. Yet, contracting out the responsibility for detention conditions 
and repatriations to IOM does not relieve the EU, Italy or Libya from their 
international legal obligations under norms prohibiting refoulement and 
norms protecting human rights.101  
 
Contracting out also raises the question of responsibility as regards IOM’s 
interventions. In the case of the repatriations of those irregular migrant 
and asylum seekers who have initially been expelled from Lampedusa 
holding centre, IOM makes itself complicit in obstructing asylum seekers’ 
right to asylum. Moreover, the fact that irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers are deported from Lampedusa without knowing that they are 
being transferred to Libya, that the removals are executed by force and 
that once in Libya migrants are again detained in police-guarded 
structures, raises serious doubts that the IOM-run repatriations from Libya 
can be identified as voluntary. When the decisions to return are made 
under duress or as an alternative to state-run forced expulsions, 
‘voluntary’ seems to designate an absence of viable options rather than a 
deliberate choice. IOM cannot be held responsible for the rule of law in the 
same way as sovereign states. However, in deporting irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers from Libya IOM is to be seen as assuming joint 
responsibility for any violation of fundamental rights asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants might suffer. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In the attempt to control the influx of ‘irregular’ migrants and asylum 
seekers to Italy via Libya, the Italian government developed a number of 
schemes within and beyond its state borders. In the holding centre 
situated on Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island and the most frequent 
point of arrival in 2004 for boats departing from Libya, Italian authorities 
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implemented detention and large-scale expulsion schemes that, according 
to NGOs, affected irregular migrants and asylum-seekers alike. In order to 
control the migratory flows prior to migrants reaching its territory, Italy 
strengthened its collaboration on illegal migration with Libya by signing a 
readmission agreement, refurbishing several detention facilities and 
funding a repatriation scheme for irregular migrants in Libya. Libya on its 
part increased internal checks on specific groups of migrants, in particular 
those originating from Sub-Saharan states, a practice resulting in 
arbitrary detentions and unsafe repatriations in which more than one 
hundred people lost their lives.  
 
Despite the Italian Government’s denial that any human rights violations 
are taking place in the Lampedusa holding centre, the European 
Parliament and the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) 
expressed concern about the conditions of detention there. The EP’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) visited the 
holding center in September 2005 and assessed the detention conditions, 
the running of the CPTA and the treatment of migrants. Both the 
European Parliament and the UNHRC called on Italy to guarantee the 
individual examination of asylum and to refrain from collective expulsions 
of undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers to Libya. The European 
Parliament stated that these expulsions constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement that prohibits the forcible return of anyone to 
a territory where they might be at risk of serious human rights violations. 
To expel asylum seekers from Italy to Libya implies returning them to a 
country which does not recognize the mandate of the UNHCR, has no 
asylum system, is not a signatory of the Geneva Convention and in which, 
as NGOs documented, irregular migrants and asylum seekers are at risk 
of arbitrary detentions, unfair trails, disappearance and torture while in 
detention. 
 
The procedural and legal safeguards for the return, removal and custody 
of third-country nationals residing illegally in EU Member States and the 
collaboration with Libya on matters of illegal migration are about to be 
regulated through the EU Return Directive and by the Libya-EU Joint 
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Action Plan. The Directive prioritizes voluntary return over forced return, 
introduces the suspension against a return decision and/or a removal 
order, and limits temporary custody to those situations where there is a 
risk of absconding. The Action Plan, on the other hand, proposes 
postponing EU assistance for return schemes for undocumented migrants 
in Libya until the Libyan Government demonstrates full respect for human 
rights and democratic principles, and a commitment to fulfil its 
international obligations toward refugees.  
 
Despite being instruments that would potentially oblige Italian authorities 
to revisit their detention and removal practices, the EU Return Directive 
and the Action Plan would still leave too much space for the Member 
States to apply restrictive exceptions and to develop bilateral 
partnerships. Since the Directive exempts the Member States from 
applying the minimum procedural and legal safeguards for the return, 
removal and custody to a transit zone, Italian authorities do not hold the 
obligation to revisit their removal practices in the Lampedusa holding 
centre so as to bring them in line with the common EU standards. 
Similarly, the scope of Member States’ interventions regarding funding of 
return schemes for irregular migrants in Libya is not contemplated by the 
Action Plan which hence imposes no limitations on repatriation programs 
for irregular migrants in Libya, such as those funded by Italy in 2003 and 
2004. Wide powers are being left to the Member States to apply exception 
and develop bilateral partnerships, which in combination with the funding 
allocated to the IOM for a programme geared inter alia towards 
developing a repatriation scheme in Libya, undermines EU efforts to 
achieve a common framework on asylum and immigration, and thereby 
improve its credibility on refugee protection. 
 
Scholars and policy analyst have approached the issue of detention and 
repatriation programmes outside EU borders in terms of the 
externalization of asylum. What this paper suggests however is that the 
implementation of detention and repatriation programs in Libya, especially 
when considered together with the expulsions from Lampedusa, do not 
actually relocate the asylum procedures outside the EU external borders 
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but rather deprive asylum-seekers of the possibility of accessing the 
asylum determination procedure. This violation of the right to asylum is 
concealed by the imagery invoked by the politicians and the media of an 
impending mass arrival of undocumented migrants from Libya to the 
Italian shores. This imagery distorts the reality of migratory movements 
from Sub-Saharan Africa into Libya, which is an established part of Libya’s 
seasonal labour migration rather than a source of irregular migration into 
Europe. While producing an erroneous representation of migratory flows in 
the Mediterranean region, the imagery of impending mass arrival also 
conceals Italy’s reluctance to admit asylum seekers into its territory and 
its unwillingness to assume its share of asylum responsibility in the EU.  
 
Current Italian-Libyan partnership indicates a new reorientation of Libyan 
politics from a pro-African to a pro-European stance. This change in 
political balances, accompanied by Libya’s tightening of border controls 
towards its Sub-Saharan neighbours is likely to clash with the principle of 
free movement of people that is a cornerstone of regional cooperation and 
integration in the Sahel-Saharan region. This shift could destabilize the 
current political balances between Libya and its neighbouring states, and 
may consequently ‘illegalize’ movements of large groups of Sub-Saharan 
nationals. 
 
The implementation of detention and expulsion schemes that illegalize 
migratory movements and impinge upon migrants’ right to seek asylum 
brings into question the political responsibility of all actors involved, 
whether they are Governments, supranational bodies or agencies. The 
Italian and Libyan governments, the European Union, and the 
International Organization for Migration all need to assume their share of 
responsibility for the violations of rights that asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants might suffer as a result of the measures and programmes they 
implement inside the EU and outside its borders.   
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8. Policy Recommendations  
 
Given the fact that data available on measures regarding detention and 
deportations of irregular migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa and 
Libya are often contradictory and incomplete, that bilateral agreements on 
irregular migration remain undisclosed and that the European Union’s 
framework leaves large discretion for the Member States to apply 
restrictive exceptions, this paper recommends transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy as key principles to guide Member States 
agenda and EU’s partnership with neighbouring states in the field of 
asylum and immigration.  
 
Transparency:  
Developing a correct assessment of the situation regarding detention, 
expulsion and asylum at the EU’s southern border is contingent upon 
gaining access to and rendering transparent the information, programmes 
and agreements that regulate repatriations of irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers in Lampedusa and Libya. Whether carried out by the 
Italian and Libyan states or by the IOM, a lack of transparency is common 
to the policies and schemes countering irregular migration from and into 
Libya. Information regarding the number, frequency and destinations of 
the return flights from Lampedusa CPTA, the content of the bilateral 
agreements between Italy and Libya and between Libya and IOM, and the 
content of the contract for the TRIM Programme co-funded by the EC 
must be made public in order to achieve a transparent Community policy 
on asylum and immigration. 
 
Accountability: 
With regards to the partnership with third countries in the area of 
migration and asylum, the EU must provide leadership in terms of human 
rights protection. The divergent interests between national and EU 
competencies over borders, asylum and immigration should not leave 
Member States with ample space to apply the exception that, as in the 
case of the EU return directive, would result in the disregard of even the 
minimum safeguards on return. In cases where either the EU or states 
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sub-contract to the IOM this does not exempt the EU, Italy or Libya from 
their international legal obligations under norms prohibiting refoulement 
and norms protecting human rights. Even though IOM cannot be held 
responsible for the rule of law in the same way as sovereign states, it 
must assure that its programmes do not impinge upon the right to seek 
asylum and must be held accountable for any violations that might occur 
as result of its actions.  
 
The lack of safeguards and control mechanisms ensuring the right to seek 
asylum and Italy’s tendency to circumvent its responsibilities on matters 
of asylum require an intervention from the European Parliament. With the 
co-decision on asylum and immigration, the EP is directly involved in the 
decision-making process and needs to propose amendments to the Return 
Directive and the Action Plan on Libya with the objective of achieving 
observance of human rights and international standards. In the absence of 
any EU monitoring mechanism in Libya, the EP should urgently visit those 
detention centres in Libya where implementation of detention and 
repatriation are funded by the EU and Italy. The EP’s intervention would 
play a crucial role in achieving a transparent and democratic procedure as 
regards to a common asylum policy and would steer it towards a rights- 
rather than a control-based approach.   
 
Legitimacy: 
Holding centres are aimed at facilitating an effective repatriation of third-
country nationals who have entered Italy illegally. Lampedusa holding 
centre does not fulfil its main functions: it facilitates only a nominal 
amount of expulsions and it perpetuates ill-treatment rather than offering 
assistance. In order to ensure that detention procedures and practices are 
in conformity with the existing domestic and international standards, a 
short-term objective is to mandate an independent monitoring body to 
make regular, unrestricted and unannounced visits there. The closure of 
Lampedusa holding centre should constitute a long-term objective.102 
Since it is classified as a clearing station, Italy is likely to disregard the set 
of minimum procedural and legal safeguards on return, removal and 
custody provided under the EU Return Directive. The centre’s closure 
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would prevent future violation of procedures and assure that migrants and 
asylum seekers rights are not sidestepped by the Italian authorities.    
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1 According to the European Court of Human Rights, collective expulsions are defined 
as “any measure by which foreigners are forced, due to their membership of a group, 
to leave a country, apart from cases in which this measure is adopted following and 
based on a reasonable and objective assessment of the specific situation of each of 
the individuals composing the group”.  
2 See European Parliament, Report from the LIBE Committee Delegation on the Visit 
to the Temporary Holding Centre in Lampedusa, EP/LIBE PV/581203EN, p.2.    
3 Ibid., p.3. 
4 See ARCI, Il diario del presidio ARCI a Lampedusa, 2005a; ARCI, Lampedusa 
Watching, 2005b.  
5 CPTA has a direct access to the runaway. For a more detailed description see 
Andrijasevic, R, ‘Lampedusa in Focus: Migrants caught between the Libyan desert and 
the deep sea’, Feminist Review no. 82, 2006, pp. 119-124.  
6 186 places are the centre’s legal capacity. See Corte dei Conti, Programma controllo 
2004. Gestione delle risorse previste in connessione con il fenomeno 
dell’immigrazione, 2005, p. 103. 
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7 Amnesty International, Italy: Temporary stay – Permanent rights: the treatment of 
foreign nationals detained in ‘temporary stay and assistance centres’ (CPTAs), 2005, 
p. 34.  
8 Law 40/1998, later merged into Legislative Decree No 286 of July 1998. Decreto 
Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286 – Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la 
disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero.  
9 The legal procedure for the asylum seekers detained in identification centres and 
CPTAs is the same. In both cases asylum seekers fall under the fast-track procedure. 
The fast-track or simplified procedure was set up by ‘Bossi-Fini’ law and it 
supplements the ordinary procedure, now reserved only for those asylum seekers who 
have entered Italy legally. 
10 The Bossi-Fini law (Law 189/2002 of July 2002) significantly tightened the Italian 
immigration policy. It reduced from 15 to 5 the number of days irregular migrants 
have at their disposal to leave Italy once they have been issued with an expulsion 
order; increased from 30 to 60 the days irregular migrants can be held in a detention 
centres; and doubled the number of years (from 5 to 10) during which those issued 
with an expulsion order are banned from entering Italy. The Law set out that those 
served with an expulsion order are to be detained in the CPTAs prior to the forcible 
escort to the border instead of receiving the injunction to leave and being expected to 
leave the country on their own without being detained in the CPTAs. It reinforced the 
expulsion methods and introduced the mandatory removal via forcible escort that 
prior to this law reform was optional and applied only when there was a concrete risk 
of a third-country national disobeying the expulsion order.   
11 The Provincial Police Authority may however request detention in order to: verify or 
determine asylum seeker’s nationality or identity if they have no identification papers 
or travel documents or if they have produced false papers on arrival; check the claims 
on which the asylum seeker’s application is grounded; and bridge the gap for those 
asylum seekers awaiting the outcome of the procedure for entry to the country. 
12 The 30 days comprise 20 initial days with a possible 10-day extension by the judge. 
For the CPTAs the maximum period of detention of 60 days involves the initial 30 days 
with a possible extension for another 30 days with judicial approval. 
13 For the list of NGOs see footnotes 26 and 50. 
14 During their visit to the Lampedusa CPTA, the delegates of the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) observed 
that the interpreters work from Arabic and English and not from French. Since many 
migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa CPTA seem to originate from Maghreb 
and sub-Saharan African countries and are French speaking, the lack of adequate 
interpretation makes it difficult to access the right information and/or state their 
circumstances.  See European Parliament, EP/LIBE PV/581203EN.    
15 See ‘Complaint against the Italian government for violation of European Community 
Law’, 20 January 2005. The complaint and the accompanying dossier are available at  
http://www.gisti.org/doc/actions/2005/italie/complaint20-01-2005.pdf  
16 An undercover journalistic inquiry found out that the difficulty of making phone-
calls is due to the fact that the phone-booth is regularly out of order. Contrary to the 
Charter of the rights and obligations of detained immigrants from 30 August 2000 
stipulating that migrants should be given a telephone card worth 5 euros every 10 
days, the phone-cards are not distributed but rather sold by the ‘dealers’ inside of the 
camp for the amount thee times higher than cards original value. See Gatti, F. ‘Io, 
clandestino a Lampedusa’, L’espresso 6 October 2005a.  
17 Following the signing of the Asylum agreement between Italian Ministry and the 
UNHCR, which comes into effect on the 1st March 2006, UNHCR will be able to 
establish its office on Lampedusa together with IOM and Italian Red Cross.  
18 The listing of who can access the CPTAs is provided under the provisions of the 
article 21 of DPR 394 of 31 august 1999. According to Italian legislation MPs have the 
right of entry to CPTAs and to all place of detention in Italy. UNHCR staff can, with the 
authorization of the Ministry of Interior, access the CPTAs anytime and speak in 
private with third-country nationals who request such encounter. In March 2005 while 
180 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers were being expelled to Libya on 
airplanes, the UNHCR’s request for immediate access to the Lampedusa CPTA was 
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denied. During the same period two Italian senators, Mrs. Chiara Acciarini and Mrs. 
Tana de Zulueta were permitted to access the CTPA only the second day of their 
arrival to the island and then only to the part of the CPTA with the offices. They could 
therefore not assess the conditions of detention nor talk to the migrants.   
19 ARCI compiled a dossier containing information as to numbers of migrants arrived 
via sea, those removed to other CPTAs or to Libya, and the descriptions of police 
practices towards migrants. Since little official data are available so far, the dossier 
presented to the MEP delegation during their September visit is a unique source. See 
Arci, 2005b. 
20 ARCI reports that many minors have been wrongly identified as adults. ARCI also 
expressed concern that, after been held in detention for 5 days, between 9th and 18th 
August 2005 only some unaccompanied minors were transferred to another CPTA 
while the rest was presumably expelled to Libya. ARCI’s data called attention to an 
alarming irregularity: after having been released from CPTA of Lampedusa, minors 
were reassigned to the reception centres of ‘Casa Amica’ in Agrigento (Sicily) and/or 
‘Association Three P’ in Licata. In Licata, they stay for an extremely short period of 
time –at times only 24 hours—and from there they are all transferred to Milan 
following Association’s declarations that they have contacted minors’ parents or 
friends, all oddly residing in Milan. This operation occurred, says ARCI, without the 
authorization or knowledge of the competent juridical authorities. Arci, 2005a. 
21 The four prefabricated containers, each with 40 beds, are insufficient for all the 
migrants. Made for 186, but accommodating commonly for 300 to 400 migrants 
between spring and autumn months, with occasional ‘peaks’ of over 1000 migrants in 
the summer, results in the majority sleeping on mats on the floor in the corridors or 
on the ground outside. 
22 Only urgent and life-threatening cases are seen by the local health-centre; all 
others are treated by Médecins sans Frontières directly at the pier or in the camp by a 
doctor and a nurse. The MSF assisted more than 10,000 people at Lampedusa 
between September 2002 and December 2003. It was refused access to any CPTAs 
from 19 April 2004 onwards following the publication of their highly critical report on 
the detention and health conditions in Italian CPTAs entitled Centri di permanenza 
temporanea e assistenza: autonomia di un fallimento; Sinnos editrice, 2005. 
23 The CPTA accommodates on average 400 migrants. It only has about 10 toilets and 
as many showers and sinks, alimented exclusively by sea water. Since the centre is 
not connected to the sewage system, the toilets are frequently clogged and they 
overspill onto the floor and the outside.  
24 This includes physical abuse, humiliation and racist remarks. See Gatti, 2005a and 
the video from inside the camp by Italian undercover journalist Mauro Parissone.  
Http://euobserver.com/22/20167 (consulted on 16/11/2005).  
25 ARCI dossier demonstrates that police use physical force to carry out deportations, 
especially when migrants resist deportation or attempt to run away, and that the sign 
of physical injuries does not prevent the police from carrying on the removal. The 
Sicilian Antiracist Network video-recorded and circulated images of deportations at the 
Lampedusa camp. Since the police prohibit filming or photographing, this material 
represents one of the few visual evidences of the deportations in Lampedusa. See 
Lampedusa Scoppia at http://www.ngvision.org/mediabase/487
26 ANAFE - Association nationale d'assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers 
(France), Asociacion ‘Andalucía Acoge’ (Spain), APDHA - Asociación Pro Derechos 
Humanos de Andalucía (Spain), ARCI - Associazione Ricreativa e Cultura Italiana 
(Italy), Asociaciòn ‘Sevilla Acoge’ (Spain), ASGI - Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici 
sull'Immigrazione (Italy), Cimade (France), Federación des Asociaciones SOS Racismo 
del Estado Español (Spain), Gisti - Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés 
(France), and ICS - Consorzio italiano solidarietà. See footnote 15. 
27 Given the short time elapsed between the arrival of the migrants and their 
deportation (at times as little as 24 hours), NGOs claim that it is unlikely that the 
CPTA authorities examined individually the cases of 1000 people. Further, they have 
been deprived of the right to file an appeal due to the decision by the Italian 
government to remove them. 
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28 Conditions of detention fall under the definition of ‘inhumane and degrading 
treatment’. 
29 AI letter to JFS Commissioner Franco Frattini, dated 21 March 2005 (B456); and AI 
appeal to the EU regarding expulsions from Italy to Libya, dated 28 June 2005 (B472) 
30 In particular with Italy’s obligation under articles 5 (information), 6 
(documentation), 7 (residence and freedom of movement), 13 and 15 (material 
reception and health care) of the directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum 
standards for the reception conditions of asylum seekers.  
31 EP/LIBE PV/581203EN, p.3. 
32 See Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ written reply prepared for the 85th session of 
the UN Human Rights Committee. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Interministerial 
Committee of Human Rights, Reply to List of Issues (CCPR/C/84/L/ITA) (Relating to 
CCPR/C/ITA/2004-5), U.N. Human Rights Committee 85th Session, Geneva 17 October 
– 3 November 2005. 
33 CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 dated 28th October 2005. 
34 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Lampedusa, 14th April 
2005, P6_TA(2005)0138. 
35 The data provided by the Italian authorities specify that 1153 migrants were 
returned to Libya between 29th September and 8th October 2004 and another 494 
between 13th and 21st of March 2005 (EP/LIBE PV/581203EN, p.2). Italian authorities 
provide no data for later expulsions. The numbers reported here come from NGO 
sources.  
36 Human Rights Watch, World Report. Events of 2005, p. 373. 
37 EP, P6_TA(2005)0138. Moreover, journalistic sources specify that the agreement 
requires Libya to increase control over its borders in the Saharan region. See Gatti, F., 
2005b.  
38 European Commission, Report on the Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal 
Immigration, 2005, pp. 58-59. 
39 In spite of the fact that the Italian MPs requested detailed information about the 
location of the camps in Libya and the amount of funding, the Italian Government 
confirmed and disclosed the position of the camps only recently in the report by the 
Italian Audit Court. The amount allocated for the construction of the camps remains 
however still unknown but according to the EC report the funding is classified as 
humanitarian support. EC, 2005, p. 59.   
40 Other destinations were Mali, Pakistan, Niger, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Sudan and 
Syria. EC, 2005, pp. 61-62. 
41 Since July 2000, Italy and Tunisia have been running joint control activities along 
the Tunisian coastline. The Italian police provide training courses for Tunisian border 
guards. Tunisia rejected the Italian funding for the establishment of detention centres 
in Tunisia since the government feared Italy’s interference into domestic affairs. 
Cuttitta, P. ‘Delocalization of migration controls to North Africa’, paper presented at 
the workshop The Europeanisation of National Immigration Policies – Varying 
Developments across Nations and Policy Areas, European Academy, 1-3 September 
2005, Berlin. 
42 While neither Italy nor IOM have disclosed the content of the project, the reports 
from NGOs and individual experts that the deportation from Lampedusa to Libya 
acquired nearly a weekly regularity after the signing of IOM-Libyan agreement 
suggest the pilot project to be a repatriation project or a so-called Assisted Voluntary 
Return (AVR) Programme. These information where gathered by the author in 
Lampedusa during the Asia-Europe Foundation workshop The Management of 
Humanitarian Aids and of Transnational Movements of Persons in the Euro-
Mediterranean Area and in South-East Asia, 28-30 August 2005, Lampedusa. 
43 The cooperation between IOM and Libyan Government was developed in the 
framework of the 5+5 Regional Dialogue on Migration. As an informal dialogue on 
migration, 5+5 Dialogue is a forum that bring together the Maghreb countries 
(Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and the countries of the ‘arc Latin’ 
(France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) to promote the prevention and fight against 
irregular migration and trafficking in countries of origin, transit and destination. As a 
partner in the 5+5 Dialogue, as preceding the regional seminar on irregular migration 
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in the western Mediterranean in Tripoli on 8 and 9 June 2004, IOM organized in 
cooperation with Libya’s People’s Committee for Public Security a training session for 
100 Libyan officials and police representatives. The focus of the session was on border 
and migration management and on assisted voluntary return for irregular migrants in 
Libya. IOM, Dialogue 5+5. Newsletter, n. 1 issue, 2004. 
44 EC, ibid., p. 15. 
45 AI, ‘Immigration Cooperation with Libya: the Human rights perspective. AI briefing 
ahead of the JHA Council 14 April 2005’.  
Http://www.amnesty-eu.org/static/documents/2005/JHA_Libya_april12.pdf   
46 For a description of these expulsions and the itineraries across the desert see F. 
Gatti, 2005b. 
47 Requested on several occasions, the Italian authorities have so far not presented 
the list of expulsions orders from the Lampedusa CPTA. During their visit to the CPTA, 
the LIBE committee could not view the records of arrivals and departures since, the 
Italian Authorities claim they are not held at the centre but at the offices of the 
Agrigento (Sicily) police.  
48 Alitalia, the Italian national air carrier, and AirAdriatic (AA), a private Croatian air 
carrier, are currently the two main companies that are removing migrants from 
Lampedusa CPTA to Libya or to other CPTAs in mainland Italy such as the one in 
Crotone. Previously, also the Italian charter carrier Blue Panorama took part in the 
removals and expulsions, but has retracted from it following pressure from NGOs and 
the protest a number of activist organized on 2nd of April 2005 --the European Day for 
Freedom of Movement-- in front of company’s offices in Rome. In Croatia, Amnesty 
International Croatia has urged AirAdriatic to cease the deportation flights to Libya 
and appealed to AA to respect international human rights conventions.   
49 Amnesty International’s report quotes testimonies of hundreds of Burkinabé 
nationals as well as several Eritrean and Nigerian migrants who were expelled from 
Libya to their country of origin after their documents and possessions were 
confiscated. They testified to having been detained in inhumane conditions, including 
lack of water, food and medical care. Amnesty International, Libya: time to make 
human rights a reality, 2004, AI INDEX MDE 19/002/2004.   
50 ‘Common Principles on removal of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers’, 
August 2005 by Amnesty International, EU Office; Caritas Europa; Churches’ 
Commission for Migrants on Europe (CCME); European Council for Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE); Human Rights Watch Jesuit Refugee Service –Europe (JRS); Platform 
for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM); Quaker Council for 
European Affairs; Save the Children; Cimade (France); Iglesia Evangelica Espanola; 
Federazione delle Chiese Evangeliche in Italia (FCEI); and SENSOA (Belgium). The 
NGOs put these principles forward as the Commission Director General for JHA visited 
Libya on 22 June 2005 in order to start the cooperation on countering of illegal 
immigration and the Commission went ahead to draft the EU return directive. 
51 These core principles are to be applied also in so-called transit, border and airport 
zones in the EU. They are: voluntary return should always be the priority; vulnerable 
persons should be protected against removal (children, seriously ill people, victims of 
trafficking and pregnant women); persons subject to a removal order should always 
have access to effective remedies, detention for the purpose of removal should be the 
last resort, family unit should be strictly respected; independent monitoring and 
control bodies should be created; use of force should comply with Council of Europe 
recommendations; re-entry ban should be prohibited; and a legal status should be 
granted to persons who cannot be removed.  
52 The non-refoulement principle has been reaffirmed by the EU as the cornerstone of 
refugee protection. It prohibits the forcible return of anyone to a territory where they 
would be at risk of serious human rights violations: "No contracting state shall expel 
or return (refouler), a refugee in any manner to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”. This principle makes 
reference to the lack of individual assessments and to the removal of persons to 
countries where there exists a serious risk to the physical integrity of those concerned 
(mentioned in article 19§2 of the European Charter).  
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53 Migrants and asylum seekers are deported to Libya, a country lacking minimum 
guarantees of protection. This is in contravention with the article II-19-2 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which "No one may be 
removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that they may 
be subjected to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment". Italy’s 
obligation to non-refouleur to a country lacking minimum guarantees of protection is 
reinforced by the fact that it is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
54 EP/LIBE PV/581203EN.  
55 The response by Alessandro Pansa, the Director General of the immigration and 
border police of the Italian Ministry of Interior delivered to the UN Human Rights 
Committee during its 85th Session on the 20th October 2005. Notes taken by Claire 
Rodier, GISTI. Http://www.migreurop.org/article909.html  
56 See footnote 32. 
57 This number was given by Italian Ministry of Interior, G. Pisanu. See il manifesto 
22nd April 2005, p. 9. Http://www.ilmanifesto.it/Quotidiano-archivio/22-Aprile-
2005/art74.html (consulted on 25/04/2005) 
58 Simoncini, A., ‘Migranti, frontiere, spazi di confine. I lavoratori migranti nell’ordine 
salariale’, altreragioni, pp. 29-45, 2000. 
59 See Caritas/Migrantes, Immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2005. Edizioni IDOS, 
Roma, 2005. 
60 Data from Italian Ministry of Interior, Http://www.cir-onlus.org/Statisticheitalia.htm 
(consulted 10 December 2005). 
61 Asylum levels in Italy are in fact among the lowest in Europe and in 2004 reported 
a fall of 26%, which is 5% above the EU average. These numbers are extrapolated 
from the UNHCR’s 2005 report on Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized 
Countries 2004. Overview of Asylum Applications lodged in Europe and non-European 
industrialized countries in 2004. Population data unit/PGDS: UNHCR Geneva. 
http://www.unhcr.ch/statistics  
62 This calculation does not take into consideration that out of 9019 requests for 
asylum filed in 2004, only 781 were approved. The readers are hence asked to bear in 
mind that a hypothetical increase calculated above concerns only requests for asylum 
rather than the allocation of the asylum status.  
63 Pliez, O. ‘La troisième migratoire, les conséquences de la politique européenne de 
lutte contre les migrations clandestines’, paper written for Asia-Europe Foundation 
workshop The Management of Humanitarian Aids and of Transnational Movements of 
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Africa, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo and Benin. African Union was 
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